Permanent distortion is one of the main drawbacks of all the irreversible watermarking schemes. Attempts to recover the original signal after the signal passing the authentication process are being made starting just a few years ago. Some common problems, such as salt-andpepper artefacts due to intensity wraparound and low embedding capacity, can now be resolved.
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a trivial task for the schemes with signal-dependent embedding capacity [1, 4, 7, [13] [14] [15] . It is thus desirable to have a scheme with signal-independent embedding capacity, which allows the user to specify a near-constant capacity and distortion in a reasonable range.
Secondly, while seriously tackled in the irreversible watermarking schemes, the wellrecognized problem of block-wise dependence, which opens a security gap for vector quantisation attack [16] (also known as the Holliman-Memon counterfeiting attack [8] , birthday attack, or collage attack [6] ) and transplantation attack [2, 10, 11] are not addressed by the researchers of the reversible schemes. Vector quantisation attack is a malicious operation of collecting some image blocks from a large set / database of images watermarked with the same scheme to create a counterfeit or 'collage'. By involving block-wise dependent or contextual information in the embedding procedure, vector quantisation attack cannot succeed because placing watermarked blocks in the wrong context will not pass the authentication.
Transplantation attack is another form of malicious operation of collecting blocks with deterministic dependence information (i.e., the dependence information is not calculated in a random but a deterministic manner) to create a counterfeit. The reader is referred to [6, 8, 16] and [2, 10, 11] for more information about vector quantisation attack and transplantation attack, respectively.
It is our intention in this work to propose a reversible watermarking scheme with nearconstant signal-independent embedding capacity and immunity to the vector quantisation attack and transplantation attack.
Related Work
Barton [3] proposed one of the earliest reversible data embedding schemes, which compresses the bits to be affected by the embedding operation for two purposes: firstly preserving the original data and secondly creating space for the payload -the secret information to be hidden. The compressed data and the payload are then embedded into the host media. This practice of compressing original data for reversibility purpose has been widely adopted [1, 7, 13] .
Honsinger et al. [9] employed reversible embedding for authentication application, which uses addition modulo 256 to overcome the problems of overflow and underflow due to embedding operation. However, apart from the embedding distortion, this modulo operation introduces saltand-pepper artefacts because intensity close to zero are flipped / wraparound to 255 and the intensities close to 255 are mapped to 0. Another ill effect of this is that the scheme may not be able to extract the payload if the number of flipped pixels is too significant. The salt-and-pepper artefacts can also be found in Macq's method [12] . Schemes with high embedding capacity and without the salt-and-pepper artefacts have been reported in [1, 7, [12] [13] [14] [15] . The main difference among these methods is that the methods of [1, 7, 13] employ compression technique for reserving the original data while the method of [14] 'clip' the intensities of some pixels before embedding payload in order to create intensity gaps for the payload. This is justifiable because of the fact that images captured by the acquisition systems are not 'perfect' presentation of the real scene. The deviation of the clipped version from the 'perfect' version is not necessarily greater than the deviation of the captured one from the 'perfect' version.
Although steady progress in terms of high embedding capacity is being made, the capacity of all the afore-mentioned methods is highly sensitive to the nature of the images. For reversible watermarking scheme such as [1, 7, 13, 14] that exploit intensity variation, images with larger low-frequency areas tend to have higher embedding capacity while the images with more high-frequency areas tend to have lower embedding capacity. Another common limitation of these methods is that the well-recognized requirement of establishing block-wise dependence for resisting vector quantisation attack and transplantation attack is not met.
Proposed Scheme
To eliminate those two common limitations of the afore-reviewed work, we propose a reversible watermarking scheme with near-constant and image-independent embedding capacity and immunity to the vector quantisation attack and transplantation attack. Let us define some symbols as follows. [6, 8, 16] and transplantation attack [2, 10, 11] . This information can be the hash output, the sum of the intensity, or some measure calculated in a random / non-deterministic manner. Specific design of s(i) in this work will be detailed later. Now let us assume that s(i) is available.
The basic idea behind the proposed work is to assign the pixels into a finite number of states characterised by some conditions so that only one-to-one transition from one state to another can be made. In the context of digital image watermarking, the intensity f(i) or the transformed form of the intensity such as Hamming code, the corresponding watermark pixel w(i), and the secret information s(i) determine the state pixel i is in. The action of forward state transition is the operation of watermark embedding and the action of backward state transition is the operation of watermark extraction.
Observations on Hamming Code
In this work, we will map / transform the intensity of each pixel in an image into a Hamming code by performing an Exclusive-OR (XOR) operation on the intensity of the pixel f(i) and a watermark pixel w(i). Although the proposed scheme can be employed for watermarking colour and grayscale images with arbitrary number of bits per pixel, without loss of generality, we will assume that we are working with 8-bit grayscale images throughout the rest of this work.
Since there are 8 bits per pixel, if we allow one value of Hamming distance to represent one main state, then there will be 9 states, which can be denoted as 
. Note that because of the symmetry, which will become clear later after Table 1 is explained, pixels in sub-sub-states of D 4
are allowed to transit to the sub-sub-state of D 3 or D 5 depending on their Hamming codes. Since the state transition is one-to-one and the watermarkable bit of each sub-sub-state is specifically defined, at the verifier's side, when a pixel is detected as watermarked and passes the authentication, the scheme will be able to negate the watermarked bit to its original value, making a backward state transition to the original sub-sub-state. From now on, we will use the words 'state', 'sub-state', and 'sub-sub-state' interchangeably.
Note also that to make the reversible embedding possible, empty states must be in existence initially. This can be achieved by changing the grayscale of an insignificant proportion of pixels and use this pre-processed image as the original. This operation is similar to the intensity clipping frequently adopted by reversible watermarking schemes [5, 14] . Giving the fact that image acquisition systems are not perfect (e.g., a captured image is by no means a perfect representation of the real scene), sensible minute changes would make the pre-processed version close to the captured image or possibly even closer to the 'perfect' version. Moreover, since the key concern of the reversible watermarking scheme is the reversibility to the image before it is watermarked, not to any prior version(s), thus, provided that the effect of the pre-processing is insignificant in terms of the number of pixels affected and the amount of intensity changes, sensible preprocessing would be acceptable for the users.
For two 8-bit numbers, the total number of possible Hamming codes can be obtained is 256.
The number of codes (or pixels) belonging to D i is the number of combination of "choosing i from 8" denoted as C (8,i) .
, and C(8, 4) = 70. For any image, except the random noise images highly similar to the secret-key-generated random watermark image w which should not be deemed as images, the Hamming codes created of the image f and w have the same statistical property, i.e. the number of pixels in state D i is close the afore-mentioned figures. Thus, a natural step toward creating empty states would be negating bit 0 of the pixels with their Hamming distance equal to 0 or 8 because these pixels account statistically for only (2/256 = 0.78%) of the total population. Another benefit of the proposed pre-processing, which will become clear later,
is that half of those pixels mapped into the new states of D 1 and D 7 are watermarkable, thus, contributes to higher embedding capacity.
Algorithm Design
Based on the above framework, the proposed algorithm can be described as follows. First, a secret-key shared by the embedder and the verifier is used to generate a random 8-bit watermark One of the key features of the proposed scheme is its property of near-constant and image-independent embedding capacity, which is to be explained as follows. From the entry in the first column of the second row of Table 1 Table 2 .
The two values of 1/2 in parentheses in the first column remind us that half of the pixels in the two states are mapped from states of D 0 and D 8 by the pre-processing operation. The symmetry and regularity of Table 1 imply the simplicity for implementing the proposed scheme while the symmetry and regularity of Note from Table 2 , we can see that the number of watermarkable pixels with more significant watermarkable bit is smaller. This is helpful in keeping distortion down.
Another key feature of the proposed work is the involvement of a secret contextual dependence information s(i) for countering vector quantisation attack and transplantation attack.
The missing definition of s(i) can now be defined as 1 . 
The purpose of the condition set in Eq. (2) is to prevent the watermarkable pixels from being involved in the calculation of s(i). Because the watermark embedder and detector sharing the same key are able to figure out the same set of watermarkable pixels, by excluding these pixels, whose value may or may not be modified, the same s(i) can be obtained at both sides. Since However, the embedding capacity is increased at the expense of having to involve more pixels in the pre-processing stage in order to make empty initial states. For example if b 1 equals 4, the number of possible Hamming codes is 16, and the pixels associated with Hamming distance 0 and 4 will have to be involved in the pre-processing stage, which account for 2/16 of the total pixel population. Although as we mentioned in the previous section that due to the imperfection of the image acquisition system, involving small proportion of pixels in the pre-processing stage is acceptable. However, large-scale involvement still needs to be avoided in practice.
Experiments
The proposed scheme has been tested on six common images as shown in Figure 1 . We involve all the 8 bits of a pixel to create Hamming code and allow the scheme to mark up to bit 3 only. The size of the tested images and the performance of the scheme in terms of pre-processing distortion, embedding distortion, and embedding capacity (bits per pixel) are listed in Table 3 .
Pre-processing distortion is the impact of the pre-processing of Step e 2.2, which is insignificant (with all the PSNR's greater than 69dB) as we mentioned in Section 2. The values of Preprocessing distortion are near-constant and independent of image because, as mentioned at the end of Section 3.1, the pixels with their Hamming distance equal to 0 or 8 account statistically for only (2/256 = 0.78%) of the total population of all kinds of image. From the table, we can also clearly see that embedding capacity and embedding distortion for Lena's Face and Lena are nearly the same. We can also see from the same table that even the nature of the images varies significantly, the embedding capacity is still nearly constant, i.e., the embedding capacity is independent of the images. These figures are closely consistent with the predicted embedding capacity (PEC), 0.0176 bits per pixel, as calculated in Eq (1). It is interesting to see that the embedding distortion in terms of PSNR inflicted on the images by the scheme is also nearconstant, with the lowest one equal to 55.719 dB. The pre-processed unwatermarked and watermarked versions of Cameraman are illustrated in Figure 2 for comparison. Note higher embedding capacity can be achieved by changing the parameters b 1 and k in Eq. (3).
The embedding capacity of Fridrich et al's scheme with 'amplitude' equal to 1 reported in [7] is converted into bits per pixels and listed in Table 4 . The embedding capacity of our proposed scheme for the first three images is listed alongside for comparison. From the first two entries of Table 4 , we can see that, with Fridrich el al's scheme, the embedding capacities of Lena's Face and Lena are 1.5 times different, while the capacities with our scheme are nearly the same. This difference is more prominent when the capacity of Mandrill image is compared against that of Lena image; Mandrill's embedding capacity is very close to zero. These figures indicate that, Fridrich el al's scheme is highly sensitive to the nature of the image. Images with more lowfrequency contents tend to have higher embedding capacity while images with more highfrequency contents tend to have relatively lower embedding capacity. Actually this is a common characteristic, which can be found in Tan's [13] , Alattar's [1] , and van Leest et al's [14] schemes. responsible for triggering the alarm, so if any pixel i fails the authentication process, the whole square area covered by N(i) is shaded to indicate that this area is not authentic (see Figure 3(b) ).
In our experiments, the size of N(i) is 9 × 9. Note that the smaller the size, the higher the resolution of tampering localisation, but the weaker the security. This is because the embedding capacity of reversible watermarking schemes is normally lower than irreversible schemes and the non-watermarkable pixels are not authenticated explicitly but protected by involving them in the calculation of s(i). If N(i) is too small, some of non-watermarkable pixels may not be covered by their nearest watermarkable pixels. As a result, manipulation of these unprotected nonwatermarkable pixels would go undetected. There is no theoretical backing for deciding the optimal size of N(i), so 9 × 9 is our empirical suggestion. shows the authentication result with the shaded blocks indicating the boundary of four patches/quadrants. Note the shaded areas appearing along the borders of Figure 4 (b) is due to the fact that in constructing N(i) to calculate s(i), we allow the image to wraparound, e.g. , the next column/row of the last column/row of the image is the first column/row, and vice versa. This is intended to detect the cropping attack. For example, in this experiment, the last column of the forged image dose not come from the same image as the first column, resulting in wrong values of s(i) during the authentication process. Consequently, the alarms would be raised.
Conclusions
We pointed out, in this work, that seeking high embedding capacity at the expense of high distortion to some extent may marginalize the advantage of fragile watermarking over cryptography and emphasized the importance of finding the balance between embedding capacity and embedding distortion. We also observed that finding this balance is not a trivial task for the schemes with signal-dependent embedding capacity and proposed a new scheme with nearconstant embedding capacity, which is independent of the host signal. We also addressed the issue of leaving a security gap open to the vector quantisation attack and transplantation attack due to the lack of non-deterministic contextual dependence information in the embedding process and proposed a simple method for establishing the dependence information. 
